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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON 
CONTROL SOLUTIONS, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
MICRODAQ.COM, INC., and DOES 1-10, 
Defendants. 
PAPAK, Magistrate Judge: 
3:15-CV-748-PK 
FINDINGS AND 
RECOMMENDATION 
Plaintiff Control Solutions, Inc. ("CSI"), brought this action against defendant 
MicroDAQ.com, Inc. ("MicroDAQ"), and ten Doe defendants in the Circuit Court of the State of 
Oregon for the County of Columbia on April 3, 2015. MicroDAQ removed CSI's action to this 
court effective May 1, 2015. CSI subsequently amended its complaint in this court effective May 
21, 2015. By and through its amended complaint, CSI alleges MicroDAQ's liability under 
Oregon statutmy law for unlawful business practices in two separate counts and for trademark 
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counterfeiting in three separate counts, under Oregon common law for interference with 
prospective business relations, for intentional interference with economic relations, and for 
trademark infringement, and under federal statutmy law for trademark infringement, false 
designation of origin, and misrepresentation. In connection with those claims, CSI seeks actual 
damages in excess of $1,200,000 plus trebling of damages, award of its litigation costs, 
disgorgement ofMicroDAQ's profits, declaratmy judgment that MicroDAQ's complained-of 
conduct was unlawful, and injunctive relief to prevent further such conduct. This court has 
subject-matter jurisdiction over CSI's action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 based on the complete 
diversity of the parties and the amount in controversy, and additionally has federal question 
jurisdiction over CSI's federal claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and in the absence of 
diversity jurisdiction could properly exercise supplemental subject-matter jurisdiction over CSI's 
state-law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. 
Now before the court is MicroDAQ's motion (#17) to dismiss CSI's claims against it for 
lack of personal jurisdiction. I have considered the motion, all of the pleadings and papers on 
file, and oral argument on behalf of the parties. For the reasons set forth below, MicroDAQ's 
motion should be granted. 
LEGAL STANDARD 
A motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction is governed by Federal Civil 
Procedure Rule 12(b)(2). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2). "In opposition to a defendant's motion to 
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that 
jurisdiction is proper." Boschetto v. Hansing, 539 F.3d 1011, 1015 (9th Cir. 2008), citing Sher v. 
Johnson, 911F.2d1357, 1361 (9th Cir. 1990). In evaluating the defendant's motion, "[t]he court 
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may consider evidence presented in affidavits to assist it in its determination and may order 
discovery on the jurisdictional issues." Doe v. Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d 915, 922 (9th Cir. 2001), 
citing Data Disc, Inc. v. Systems Technology Assoc., Inc., 557 F.2d 1280, 1285 (9th Cir. 1977). 
If the comi decides the motion based on the pleadings and affidavits submitted by the pmiies 
without conducting an evidentiary hearing, "the plaintiff need make only a prima facie showing 
of jurisdictional facts to withstand the motion to dismiss." Id., quoting Ballard v. Savage, 65 
F.3d 1495, 1498 (9th Cir. 1995). In the absence of such an evidentimy hearing, the comi accepts 
uncontrove1ied allegations contained within the plaintiffs complaint as true, and resolves 
conflicts between statements contained within the parties' affidavits in the plaintiff's favor. See 
id 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
I. The Parties 
Plaintiff CSI is an Oregon corporation with its principal place of business in St. Helens, 
Oregon. CSI is in the business of selling calibrated the1mometers and temperature data logging 
devices. 
Defendant MicroDAQ is a New Hampshire corporation with its principal place of 
business in Contoocook, New Hampshire. MicroDAQ is also in the business, inter a/ia, of 
selling calibrated thermometers and temperature data logging devices. CSI offers no allegation · 
regarding the identities of the Doe defendants or of their role, if any, in the conduct underlying 
CSI's claims. 
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II. The Parties' Dispute1 
CSI claims common law trademark, service mark, and trade name rights and protection in 
certain phrases and combinations of words, including its website address 
"www.vfcdataloggers.com," variants of its company name including "Control Solutions" and 
"Control Solutions, Inc.," and names or designations of its products, including "VFC 5000," 
"VFC 5000 TP," and "VFC 5000 TP Kit." CSI has attempted to register the mark 
"vfcdataloggers.com," to date unsuccessfully. 
Beginning in October 2013, MicroDAQ began using Google Adwords for purposes of 
one or more internet advettising campaigns. During the course of such a campaign, when an 
internet user conducts a Google search utilizing any of certain keywords specified by the 
adve1tiser, a targeted advettisement not saliently distinguishable from an ordinary search result 
appears on the user's screen among the ordinary Google search results, generally at the top of the 
list of such results. MicroDAQ's Adwords campaigns launched in October 2013 predominantly 
relied on keywords related to the Center for Disease Control's "Vaccines For Children" program; 
among the keywords relied upon were CSI's foredescribed marks and/or trade names. Thus, 
during the course ofMicroDAQ's campaigns launched in October 2013, an internet user's search 
for CSI's proprietary product the "VFC 5000 TP Kit" would yield, in addition to (and above) 
ordinaty search results including chiefly CSI's website and products, an apparent "result" 
purpotting to reference CSI's product but in fact including a hyperlink to MicroDAQ's website 
1 Except where otherwise indicated, the following recitation constitutes my construal of 
the allegations of plaintiff CSI's complaint, of any matters incorporated by reference therein, of 
any matters properly subject to judicial notice, and of the parties' evidentiaty proffers in the light 
most favorable to CSI, on the assumption that each of CSI's allegations is accurate and resolving 
any factual conflict in the patties' evidentiaty proffers in CSI's favor. 
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and purchasing system, with no link to CSI's website or to any of its products. MicroDAQ has 
never offered any of CSI's products for sale to the public, on its website or otherwise. 
On or around Februaiy 28, 2015, CSI learned ofMicroDAQ's Google Adwords 
campaigns and discovered that the campaigns relied in part on CSI's marks and/or trade names. 
On March 10, 2015, CSI sent MicroDAQ a letter demanding that it cease and desist all such 
Adword campaigns. On March 11, 2015, MicroDAQ's Sales & Marketing Manager replied to 
CSI's letter, conceding that MicroDAQ had been running two such campaigns, asserting that he 
had been unaware of the campaigns, apologizing for the use of CSI-related keywords in the 
campaigns, and asserting that the campaigns had been shut down. 
Each ofCSI's claims herein arises out ofMicroDAQ's use ofCSI-related keywords in 
connection with Google Adword internet advertising campaigns as described above. 
MicroDAQ offers the declaration testimony of its founder and president, Philip Reeder, 
that over the course of its Google Adwords campaigns, it made only a single sale resulting from a 
Google search using one of CS I's marks or trade names (specifically, a search for "vfc-5000"). 
Reeder declares that the resulting purchase was for two of MicroDAQ's temperature data loggers 
to a Tennessee company in March 2015, that the sale price was in total $305, and that the 
purchaser subsequently returned the data loggers for a refund. Reeder fu1iher declares that 
MicroDAQ has no physical presence in Oregon, has never owned or leased property in Oregon, 
has no employees in Oregon, has never had a bank account in Oregon, has never registered or 
become licensed to do business in Oregon, has never paid taxes in Oregon, and has never 
unde1iaken any advertising campaign specifically directed at potential customers based in Oregon 
(other, presumably, than its reliance on keywords related to Oregon-based CSI and its products in 
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connection with its Adwords campaigns between October 2013 and March 2015). Reeder fmiher 
declares that over the past three years MicroDAQ has made approximately $80,000 in annual 
sales to Oregon-based customers in connection with all of its product lines, that such sales 
represent approximately 1.6% ofMicroDAQ's total annual sales, and that MicroDAQ's total sales 
over the past three years to Oregon-based customers in connection solely with its product lines in 
which it competes directly with CSI have amounted to $939. A large prop01iion ofMicroDAQ's 
sales to Oregon customers have been to municipalities and state agencies. 
ANALYSIS 
As noted above, MicroDAQ challenges this court's personal jurisdiction over it. "When 
no federal statute governs personal jurisdiction, the district comi applies the law of the forum 
state." Boschetto, 539 F.3d at 1015, citing Panavision Int'! L.P. v. Toeppen, 141F.3d1316, 1320 
(9th Cir. 1998). Oregon's long-arm statute creates a standard co-extensive with federal 
jurisdictional standards, see Or. R. Civ. P. 4L, so a federal comi sitting in the District of Oregon 
may exercise personal jurisdiction wherever it is possible to do so within the limits of federal 
constitutional due process, see, e.g., Gray & Co. v. Firstenberg 1\!Iach. Co., 913 F.2d 758, 760 
(9th Cir. 1990). 
Federal due process jurisprudence requires that, to be subject to the personal jurisdiction 
of a federal court, a nomesident defendant must have at least "'minimum contacts"' with the 
court's forum state such that "the exercise of jurisdiction 'does not offend traditional notions of 
fair play and substantial justice."' Schwarzenegger v. Fred i\!Iartin 1\!Iotor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 801 
(9th Cir. 2004), quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). Two 
forms of personal jurisdiction are available for application to a nonresident defendant: general 
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personal jurisdiction and specific personal jurisdiction. 
"For general jurisdiction to exist over a nonresident defendant ... , the defendant must 
engage in continuous and systematic general business contacts ... that approximate physical 
presence in the forum state." Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 801, quoting Helicopteros Nacionales 
de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 416 (1984) and Bancroft & }vfasters, Inc. v. Augusta 
Nat'!, Inc., 223 F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th Cir. 2000). "This is an exacting standard, as it should be, 
because a finding of general jurisdiction permits a defendant to be haled into court in the forum 
state to answer for any of its activities anywhere in the world." Id, citing Brand v. lvfenlove 
Dodge, 796 F.2d 1070, 1073 (9th Cir. 1986). 
Where a corporate defendant is neither headquaitered nor incorporated in the forum state, 
for a district comt's exercise of general personal jurisdiction over it to be proper, its general 
business contacts with that state must be so continuous and systematic "as to render it essentially 
at home" there. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 761 (2014), quoting Goodyear Dunlop 
Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851 (2011), citing International Shoe, 326 
U.S. at 317; see also id. at 760-762. The United States Supreme Court has emphasized that 
general personal jurisdiction under such circumstances would be "an exceptional case," id at 761 
n. 19, and should be based not "solely on the magnitude of the defendant's in-state contacts" but 
rather on "an appraisal of a corporation's activities in their entirety, nationwide and worldwide," 
id. at 762 n. 20; see also id ("[a] corporation that operates in many places can scarcely be 
deemed at home in all of them"). 
CSI argues that MicroDAQ's general business contacts with Oregon are sufficient to 
permit the exercise of general personal jurisdiction over it in this district. CSI notes that 
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MicroDAQ has been making sales to Oregon customers since 2008, and that over the past three 
years its Oregon sales have averaged approximately $80,000 annually. In addition, CSI notes 
that because many of MicroDAQ's Oregon sales are to municipal bodies, and argues that because 
those bodies are subject to state regulatory law in connection with their purchases from private 
vendors, MicroDAQ effectively avails itself of the protection of Oregon law in connection with 
each such sale. On that basis, CSI argues that it would be reasonable to hale MicroDAQ into 
comi in Oregon on grounds of general personal jurisdiction. 
CSI misconstrues the standard applicable to general personal jurisdiction. MicroDAQ's 
Oregon sales constitute only 1.6% of its total annual sales. Those sales, notwithstanding that 
many of them are to Oregon municipal bodies subject to state regulatory law, considered together 
with MicroDAQ's conduct in utilizing keywords relating to Oregon-based CSI, its website, and 
its products, are patently insufficient to render MicroDAQ "at home" in Oregon rather than in 
New Hampshire (where it is incorporated and headquartered, where its employees are, where its 
bank accounts are, and where it conducts its business). See, e.g., Daimler AG, 134 S. Ct. at 762 
n. 20. This court therefore may not properly exercise general personal jurisdiction over 
MicroDAQ. 
The courts of the Ninth Circuit apply a three-pronged test for determining whether, in 
connection with a given claim, the exercise of specific personal jurisdiction over a nonresident 
defendant could be proper: 
(1) The non-resident defendant must purposefully direct his activities or 
consummate some transaction with the forum ... ; or perfo1m some act by which 
he purposefully avails himself of the privilege of conducting activities in the 
forum, thereby invoking the benefits and protections of its laws; 
(2) the claim must be one which arises out of or relates to the defendant's 
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forum-related activities; and 
(3) the exercise of jurisdiction must comport with fair play and substantial justice, 
i.e. it must be reasonable. 
Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 802, quoting Lake v. Lake, 817 F.2d 1416, 1421 (9th Cir. 1987). 
The plaintiff bears the burden of satisfying the first two prongs of the test, whereupon the burden 
shifts to the defendant to '"present a compelling case' that the exercise of jurisdiction would not 
be reasonable." Id, quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudze>11icz, 471U.S.462, 476-78 (1985). 
In the context of cases that sound primarily in contract, the Ninth Circuit applies a 
"purposeful availment" analysis to determine whether a defendant has "purposefully avail[ ed] 
itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits 
and protections of its laws" and thereby satisfying the first prong of the three-pronged test. 
Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 802, quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958). In the 
context of cases-like this one, see, e.g., International Order of Job's Daughters v. Lindeburg & 
Co., 633 F.2d 912, 915 (9th Cir. 1980)-that sound primarily in t01i, to dete1mine whether the 
first prong of the three-pronged minimum-contacts test is satisfied the comis of the Ninth Circuit 
employ a three-paii "effects" test derived from Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789 (1984), which 
requires that the defendant allegedly have (1) committed an intentional act, (2) expressly aimed at 
the forum state, (3) causing harm that the defendant knows is likely to be suffered in the forum 
state." Dole Food Co. v. Watts, 303 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2002). "The requirement is but a 
test for dete1mining the more fundamental issue of whether a 'defendant's conduct and connection 
with the forum state are such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there."' 
Id, quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980). 
In applying the Calder effects test, the courts are required to "look[) to the defendant's 
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contacts with the forum State itself, not the defendant's contacts with persons who reside there." 
Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1122 (2014). That is, the out-of-state defendant's relationship 
with the forum state "must arise out of contacts that the 'defendant himself creates with the forum 
State," id. (emphasis original), quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475, and the defendant's link 
with the forum state cannot be based solely on the defendant's conduct directed toward the 
plaintiff, notwithstanding that the plaintiff is a forum-state resident, or otherwise solely on the 
plaintiff's own contacts with the forum state, see id. at 1122-1123. "Thus, a 'mere injmy to a 
forum resident is not a sufficient connection to the fmum.' . . . Rather, 'an injmy is 
jurisdictionally relevant only insofar as it shows that the defendant has formed a contact with the 
forum State.'" Picot v. Weston, 780 F.3d 1206, 1214 (9th Cir. 2015), quoting Walden, 134 S. Ct. 
at 1125. 
The second prong of the three-pronged minimum-contacts test for specific personal 
jurisdiction requires that the plaintiff's claim arise out of the nomesident defendant's 
forum-related activities. See Bosche/lo, 539 F.3d at 1016. Moreover, it has long been settled law 
in the Ninth Circuit that " [ w ]here ... a plaintiff raises two [or more] separate causes of action, the 
court must have in personam jurisdiction over the defendant with respect to each claim." Data 
Disc, Inc. v. Systems Technology Associates, Inc., 557 F.2d 1280, 1289, n. 8 (9th Cir. 1977), 
citing 6 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure§ 1588, at p. 816 (1971). 
At the third prong of the specific personal jurisdiction test, the burden shifts to the 
defendant to present a "compelling case" to rebut the presumption that the exercise of specific 
personal jurisdiction would be reasonable. See id. 
In dete1mining reasonableness, th[ e] [courts of the Ninth] circuit examine[] seven 
factors: the extent of purposeful inte1jection; the burden on the defendant to 
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defend the suit in the chosen forum; the extent of conflict with the sovereignty of 
the defendant's state; the forum state's interest in the dispute; the most efficient 
forum for judicial resolution of the dispute; the importance of the chosen fmum to 
the plaintiffs interest in convenient and effective relief; and the existence of an 
altemative forum. 
Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 897 F.2d 377, 386 (9th Cir. 1990), citing Federal Deposit Ins. 
Corp. v. British-American Ins. Co., Ltd, 828 F.2d 1439, 1442 (9th Cir. 1987). "The court[s] 
must balance the seven factors to determine whether the exercise of jurisdiction would be 
reasonable." Id., citing British-American, 828 F.2d at 1442. 
MicroDAQ challenges CSI's ability to satisfy the first two prongs of the three-prong 
minimum-contacts test which, as noted above, together require that the plaintiffs claims arise out 
of or relate to conduct purposefully directed into the forum state, conduct constituting a 
transaction consummated with the forum state, or conduct constituting purposeful availment of 
the privilege of conducting business within the forum state. See Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 
802. Because CSI's claims all sound in to1i, and because CSI's claims to not arise out of or relate 
to any ofMicroDAQ's transactions consummated with any Oregon municipality, the question 
whether MicroDAQ purposefully directed its conduct into Oregon is determined by the metric of 
the Calder effects test; MicroDAQ specifically argues that, in light of Walden, supra, and Picot, 
supra, CSI cannot satisfy the "expressly aimed at the forum state" element of the three-part 
Calder effects test by pointing to the conduct underlying CSI's claims. CSI argues in response 
that by employing keywords relating to Oregon-incorporated and -headquartered CSI, its website, 
and its products, MicroDAQ expressly targeted CSI and by so doing "expressly aimed" tmiious 
misconduct into Oregon, where CSI is located. CSI argues that such aiming is sufficient to 
satisfy the Calder effects test as that test was aiiiculated in pre-Walden Ninth Circuit 
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jurisprudence such as, e.g., Bancroft & }I/asters, Inc. v. Augusta Nat'/ Inc., 223 F.3d 1082, 1087-
1088 (9th Cir. 2000) (requiring only express aiming at a forum resident for satisfaction of the 
second element of the Calder effects test). 
I agree with CSI that, prior to Walden, MicroDAQ's alleged conduct in expressly aiming 
intentional t01iious misconduct at a forum resident likely would have been sufficient to satisfy 
the express aiming requirement of the Calder effects test. However, I likewise agree with 
MicroDAQ that, post-Walden, express aiming at a forum resident is jurisdictionally relevant only 
insofar as it constitutes a single contact with the forum state, and is insufficient without more to 
satisfy the express aiming requirement, which requires contacts created by the defendant directly 
with the forum state, and not merely with a forum-state resident. See Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1122-
1123, 1125; see also Picot, 780 F.3d at 1214. This court is bound to follow the guidance of 
Walden and Picot, and therefore may not properly exercise specific personal jurisdiction over 
MicroDAQ, whose alleged tortious misconduct was directed at CSI but not otherwise at, or into, 
the State of Oregon. 
Because in consequence of its inability to satisfy the express aiming requirement of the 
Calder effects test CSI cannot meet its burden to establish purposeful direction prong of the 
three-pronged minimum-contacts test, this court need not analyze the third prong of the 
minimum-contacts test, relating to whether exercise of personal jurisdiction over the out-of-state 
defendant would comp01i with fair play and substantial justice. 
In the alternative to denial of MicroDAQ's motion, CSI requests leave of colni to conduct 
discovery bearing on the personal jurisdiction issue, and additionally requests that the comi defer 
fmiher proceedings in connection with MicroDAQ's motion while such discovery is ongoing. 
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However, neither in CSI's opposition memorandum nor at oral argument has CSI identified any 
discoverable facts that could support modification of the foregoing conclusions. There being no 
grounds to suppo1i the conclusion that to grant such leave would not be futile, CSI's alternative 
request for leave to conduct jurisdictional discove1y should be denied. 
Because this court cannot properly exercise personal jurisdiction over MicroDAQ, 
MicroDAQ's motion should be granted and CSI's claims against it should be dismissed without 
prejudice. In addition, because CSI's complaint contains no allegations ofto1iious misconduct by 
the Doe defendants, and because the record contains no evidence to support the conclusion that 
this court could properly exercise personal jurisdiction over those defendants, CSI's claims 
against the Doe defendants should likewise be dismissed without prejudice. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set fotih above, MicroDAQ's motion (#17) to dismiss should be granted, 
and CSI's claims should be dismissed without prejudice in their entirety. A final judgment 
should be prepared. 
SCHEDULING ORDER 
The Findings and Recommendation will be refet1'ed to a district judge. Objections, if any, 
are due foutieen (14) days from service of the Findings and Recommendation. Ifno objections 
are filed, then the Findings and Recommendation will go under advisement on that date. 
II I 
II I 
II I 
If objections are filed, then a response is due fomieen (14) days after being served with a 
Page 13 - FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION 
Case 3:15-cv-00748-PK    Document 27    Filed 07/30/15    Page 13 of 14
copy of the objections. When the response is due or filed, whichever date is earlier, the Findings 
and Recommendation will go under advisement. 
Dated this 30th day of July, 2015. 
C) o1) .t \ awc\~cU? 
Honorable Paul Papa 
United States Magistrate Judge 
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